Religious Diversities and Social Stratification among Muslims in India

Raziuddin Aquil

The communal politics of vote banks homogenizes and gives the impression of a monolithic community of Muslims, but their voting patterns might indicate that they exercise their powers judiciously and tactically, mainly to defeat those political parties which desperately seek to create and exploit polarization on religious lines. They not only reject a rightist Hindu party and understandably so, but also ensure that communal Muslim outfits routinely lose their deposits in the so-called Muslim-dominated constituencies. For people who are otherwise perceived as itching to fight and die for what they think to be the cause of Allah, it appears as a contradiction in terms that they look for parties and candidates with a commitment to secularism, which calls for a just politics aimed at safeguarding a vulnerable and marginalized minority population and not necessarily for some quick bargains known as minority appeasement. The failure of communal parties, which invoke religious sentiments for electoral gains, also reveals their inability to make sense of and come to terms with religious diversities and social stratification, which are often ignored or dismissed as unimportant.

​Contrary to the general perception of a solidly united and mentally closed community fighting a losing battle against the enemies of Islam, Muslims are divided into a large number of communities with leaders and intellectuals often working at cross purposes. Though Indian democracy provides a level playing field, the majority Sunni population makes life difficult for a miniscule Shia minority, not so much by direct violence, but just by the sheer pressure of its overwhelming numbers. Yet, the dominant communities or sects are known to marginalize and suppress smaller splinter communities or sub-sects. Within Sunni Islam, besides juridical divisions—Hanafi, Shafi‘i, Maliki, and Hanbali—groups such as the Barelwis, Tablighis and those adhering to Jama‘at-i-Islami do not miss any opportunity to pull each other down.

​Theologically, Barelwis follow traditional Sufi-oriented Islam, known for its ability to adjust to divergent social contexts and make compromises, though within the boundary of the Hanafi school. Seemingly branching off from the kind of work done by medieval Sufis, the reformist Tablighi Jama‘at aims at fashioning Muslims in terms of the way they style themselves and the adherence to correct practices of Islam. The Tablighi emphasis on making a Muslim look like one and distinct from non-Muslims—physiognomically and sartorially—creates a cultural faultline, even if they abhor direct involvement in politics. The domain of political opinions is sought to be occupied by a more modern outfit with a revivalist outlook, Jama‘at-i-Islami, for whom political power is an instrument for setting things right from the point of view of its own understanding of Islam—which is at odds with that of the Barelwis and the Tablighis. 

Smaller and newer groups such as the Ahl-i Hadis are creating further difficulties in achieving a consensus, with the culture of 'fatwas' playing a divisive role—juris-consults or muftis of each group denouncing each other with charges of innovation (shirk) and even infidelity (kufr). These are charges which could lead to bloodshed in a theologically-driven state, but in the Indian context with the felt need for unity, a conservative forum such as the All India Muslim Personal Law Board has been struggling to keep together a variety of interested parties—sections of Shias and women have walked out to form their own separate boards for matters relating to shari‘at, or customary Islamic practices with claims of legal validity.

​Sociologically, despite all the celebration of brotherhood and egalitarianism in Islam, typically discriminatory caste-like hierarchies and stratification form a social reality, which is increasingly being highlighted in the political arena. Originating in Hindu professional caste-groups, the majority of Indian Muslim communities—organized in zaat or biraadri—have been resisting the domination of the so-called upper ‘caste’ Muslims. Identified as ashraaf, the upper castes such as Syed, Sheikh, Pathan and Malik have also been undergoing a process of Islamization, though some of them like to trace their ancestry to early Muslim immigrants from the Middle East, Iran, and Central Asia. Such claims notwithstanding, a closer look might reveal that a majority of Indian Muslims, upper castes included, are basically ethnic Indians, or Hindu converts, though it is not going to be easy for right-wing Hindutva groups to appropriate them and subsume their identity as Muslims, through what they call ghar-waapsi.

​Theological and social differentiations apart, linguistic and sub-ethnic groups have also been outlining and asserting their cultural boundary-markers. Muslims south of the Deccan have little or no affinity with those in the north. Similarly, in the east, a vast Bengali-speaking Muslim population has historically been uncomfortable with the occasional privileging of north Indian Urdu Muslim culture, whereas Urdu-speaking Bihari Muslims, like Biharis generally, have few to speak for them. These diverse and competing positions—at various levels of emergence and political negotiation—eventually transcend the barriers to unite in the name of Islam, often with terrible consequences, including political marginalisation and economic deprivation.

​Flawed, even dangerous, political strategies create conditions of communal polarization in which Muslims feel and act like members of a beleaguered minority—struggling to survive the perceived onslaught of a vast majority. As is well-known, aggressive politics of social exclusion creates profound inequalities, pushing hapless people to live in ghetto-like conditions and desperately speak in the language of violence.  

​The people in power fail to recognize and acknowledge that the Muslim situation in India overall is continuously deteriorating, and when they do, it is in the form of the usual lip service and tokenism. As a matter of fact, sections of Muslim communities suffer from the same kind of problems as others belonging to the vast undifferentiated masses of poor people—utter lack of quality modern skill-oriented education, widespread unemployment, wretched poverty and lack of even the most basic of amenities. Politicians with some commitment to the idea of justice, and aspirations to know Muslim minds better should perhaps also learn to distinguish people by the style of their beard, shape of the cap, and cut and length of their pyjamas, not to miss interesting designs of scarves and veils now being put on by increasingly assertive Muslim women in public, with some deference to conventional notions of modesty as well as new claims to their own agency.

​To conclude with the question of diversity, according to reports, Prophet Muhammad had anticipated the division of the community of his followers into over 70 firqas or sects, though only one of which might be strictly following the righteous path shown by him. A wise theological move might have been to work for Islamic unity and achieve consensus through peaceful discussion and respectful coexistence. Instead, a hawkish approach has led to schism and violence in the name of Islam, even as the dichotomy between egalitarianism and hierarchies also remains unresolved. 

A shorter version of this article was previously published in the Sunday Guardian: http://www.sunday-guardian.com/analysis/muslims-not-a-monolithic-community